National food security is one of the main justifications used to oppose agricultural trade liberalization in Japan. Opponents of agricultural trade liberalization argue that because food supply is subject to various uncertainties, importation of cheap foods is too risky a policy. We used a Monte Carlo simulation to perform a computable general equilibrium analysis and investigated the impact of trade liberalization on national food security with random productivity shocks in four major crop markets, such as rice and wheat. Our results indicate that not only would the level of welfare be improved but also its fluctuations would be reduced by trade liberalization of rice, which shows almost perfect self-sufficiency, and by that of other crops whose supply depends heavily on importation. This double dividend would be obtained even when we focused on the cases of extremely poor crops yields.
Introduction
While the self-sufficiency rate of rice is almost perfect, Japan heavily depends on foreign sources for supply of other major crops. The self-sufficiency rates, measured on the basis of calories, were 97% for rice, 9% for wheat, 0% for maize, and 6% for soybeans in 2010. 1 The almost perfect self-sufficiency rate of rice is achieved by prohibitively high border barriers to protect the domestic rice farmers from cheap foreign rice. To resist the agricultural trade liberalization in the globalizing world economy, protectionists have often insisted on two justifications to call for exceptional treatments for rice. One is "national food security." They anticipate that the food supply could be jeopardized by the uncertainty of food production and supply in, especially, foreign countries. The other is (good) externalities
by "multi-functionality of agriculture."
The relevance of the former in the rice market was examined by Tanaka and Hosoe (2011) . They assumed productivity fluctuations of rice and simulated trade liberalization using a world trade computable general equilibrium (CGE) model in combination with
Monte Carlo simulation, following Harris and Robinson (2001) . They found that the gains from trade would significantly exceed the negative impact of bad crops in foreign countries and that Japan would suffer from rice trade liberalization as a national food security concern only if major exporters resorted to rice embargos against Japan only as often as once in several years. Maeda and Kano (2008) Japanese supply of all crops aside from rice heavily depends on imports. Japan's wheat demand was mostly covered by North America (80%) and Australia (20%) in 2010.
Ninety percent of maize imports and 80% of soybean imports come from North America. 2 If national food security is indeed aimed at securing calorie intake in Japan, not domestic crop production, we must consider the uncertainty of supply for other major crops as seriously as we do for rice. Actually, the total calories supplied by wheat and soybeans reach 403 kcal/day/person, which is comparable with the calories of 580 kcal/day/person from rice. 3 To justify agricultural protection to secure the food supply, we need to measure how much agricultural trade liberalization for these major crops could undermine national food security and whether the benefit of protection exceeds that of free trade. To approach this issue quantitatively, we used a world trade CGE model and applied a Monte Carlo simulation to this CGE analysis. We simulated trade liberalization of major crops by Japan subject to random productivity shocks all over the world and measured their impact on food supply and economic welfare in Japan. Our simulation results suggest that, even with productivity shocks, agricultural trade liberalization would bring about a double dividend to the Japanese economy by increasing the means of its welfare distributions and by reducing their variances. While trade liberalization of rice would bring about the largest benefit among the four major crops, the benefit of trade liberalization of wheat and maize would be also sizable.
Section 2 explains our CGE model and simulation methods. Section 3 shows our simulation results. In its first half, we examine the mean and variance of welfare distributions generated in our Monte Carlo experiments to show the consistency between agricultural trade liberalization and national food security. In the latter half of Section 3, we focus on several extremely bad crop cases among our Monte Carlo draws to verify the robustness of our conclusions. We conclude our study by discussing the implications of our 2 Japan Customs, Trade Statistics. primary factors so that we could make a clear comparison among the four major crop markets (Table 2 .1). To describe a short-run phenomenon caused by productivity shocks, we assumed that capital, which includes farmland, was immobile among sectors. We assumed no crop stocks held by either the governments or private agents, partly to simplify the model and partly to consider a restrictive situation that would describe a severe scenario. As we focused on national food security for Japan, "grain" and "oilseed" mean maize and soybeans, respectively. As described by Hosoe et al. (2010) , we calibrated the model to the data and Armington (1969) elasticity provided by GTAP Database Version 8 for 2007 (Hertel et al. (1997) ). The elasticity of substitution among primary factors was assumed to be 0.2 for the agricultural sectors and 1.0 for the other seven sectors (Figure 2 .1). The elasticity of substitution among agricultural goods and foods for households was assumed to be 0.1 (Figure 2 .2). 4
4 We conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to these elasticity parameters. Details are shown in the Appendix. We assumed random productivity shocks for rice, wheat, grain, and oilseed. The shocks were implemented as changes in the total factor productivity in the Leontief functions in Figure 2 .1. That is, agricultural output increases/decreases even with the same number of intermediates and composite factors in a good/bad crop year. The productivity shocks occur randomly; the randomness is determined by the normal distribution characterized by the standard deviations estimated for those 10 regions and four major crops with their yield data while technological progress was controlled for with a time trend variable (Table 2 .2). Large standard deviations were found for grain and oilseed in Japan and all four of the crops in Australia and New Zealand. The latter may well be considered a serious risk factor for Japan's food supply, because Australia is one of the major food exporters to Japan. 
Simulation Scenario
We carried out Monte Carlo experiments with respect to the productivity of the four major crops in the 10 regions. We generated 1,000 draws for each scenario, assuming that productivity followed an independent, identically distributed normal distribution cases for Japan and Australia as well as Russia, the assumed worst crops were around 20-30% less than usual. Good crop cases showed moderate yields, too. The means and the standard deviations of the 1,000 draws generated were consistent with the original assumption as the central limit theorem predicts. (Brooke et al. (2012) ).
We considered cases with and without unilateral agricultural trade liberalization by Japan for all crops at once and for each one of the four crops individually. For rice trade liberalization, we assumed liberalization for both paddy and processed rice. With these 5 However, this case was too extreme to solve numerically when we assumed 30% larger elasticity values for sensitivity analysis. Details are shown in the Appendix. policy experiments, we measured the impact of Japan's agricultural trade liberalization on its national food security subject to uncertainty of productivity.
The trade barriers are indeed high for paddy and processed rice, but they are also high for wheat and grain (i.e., maize); their marginal impact is expected to be sizable (Table   2 .4). 6 In contrast, the barrier is almost zero for oilseed, and thus the impact of its liberalization is expected to be negligible. As the import dependency of these crops other than rice reaches 90% or so, Japan may gain much from further trade liberalization but be seriously affected by the impact of foreign-made shocks exacerbated by the increased import penetration. We considered the effects of these shocks and the distortions by these high trade barriers jointly to measure their combined impact in our simulations. Compiled by the author using the GTAP Database version 8. 6 As the trade barriers reported in the GTAP database are estimated on the basis of the price differences across borders, it is often pointed out that the estimated barriers and thus the impact of their abolition in simulations are overestimated. However, in our study, we demonstrated that none of the national food security or welfare in Japan would be undermined by the abolition of such overestimated trade barriers.
3.
Simulation Results
Impact of Productivity Shocks on Welfare by Region
In the first experiment, we simulated productivity shocks for all of the four major crops all over the world without unilateral agricultural trade liberalization by Japan (Scenario A0) and with it (Scenario A1) and measured their impact on Japan's welfare.
Without trade liberalization, the welfare would distribute around the break-even point with a few extremely poor welfare cases (the first panel in Figure 3 .1). Trade liberalization would increase the mean of the welfare distributions upward to bring deterministic gains from trade and would reduce its variance to bring stochastic gains (the second panel in Figure   3 .1). That is, we can expect a double dividend from free trade. Indeed, we assumed identical shocks for these two experiments, but Scenario A1 shows no negative welfare outcome while Scenario A0 shows the above-mentioned extremely poor welfare outcome in a few cases ( Source: The author's estimates.
To identify the contributions of the productivity shocks to these welfare distributions by region, we simulated the productivity shocks, first, only for Japan without trade liberalization (Scenario J0) and with it (Scenario J1), and then only for the other regions without it (Scenario R0) and with it (Scenario R1). The result of Scenario J0 shows that trade liberalization would shift the mean of the welfare distribution and would reduce its variance markedly (the fourth panel in Figure 3 .1). This implies that trade liberalization would allow Japan to pool the risks across the border more flexibly.
In contrast, the result of Scenario R1 shows that although people are concerned that trade liberalization could invite risks originating from the foreign-made shocks, it would not increase the welfare variations (the sixth panel in Figure 3 .1). This is partly because all the crops except rice had been almost fully supplied by foreign countries before the liberalization and partly because the anticipated productivity shocks shown in Table 2.2 are not large in the foreign regions except for Australia and New Zealand and Russia. Table 3 .1 shows that even if we anticipate productivity shocks in the foreign regions, the trade liberalization would reduce the fluctuations of welfare. That is, raising trade barriers to reduce agricultural imports and to keep the self-sufficiency rates high for these four major crops would not mitigate the negative impact of foreign-made shocks but rather make the food supply less secure.
Impact of Productivity Shocks on Welfare by Crop
The estimates of these deterministic and stochastic gains are dependent on crops-specific factors, such as supply capacity, household demand, and original trade barriers assumed in the base run. Here, we quantified the effects of trade liberalization for each crop by assuming their productivity shocks all over the world (Figure 3 .2). The result of Scenario Rice A1, where we considered productivity shocks and trade liberalization only for rice, shows that the shift of the welfare distribution would be almost as large as that observed in Scenario A1. This indicates that the overall deterministic and stochastic gains in Scenario A1 are largely but not fully attributable to the gains from free rice trade. The gains from free rice trade are, however, only 75% of the overall gains (Table 3 .1).
Trade liberalization for wheat and grain (maize), whose import penetration rates have already exceeded 90%, would also bring about strictly positive welfare gains in terms of its larger means and smaller variations (Wheat A1, Grain A1). The gains from wheat and maize trade liberalization account for 14% and 10% of the overall welfare gains shown in Scenario A1, respectively ( In the analysis in the previous section, we examined the means and standard deviations as summary statistics of the welfare distributions. Although we found agricultural trade liberalization had a preferable welfare impact overall, some rare but extremely bad crop cases may be considered too adverse for trade liberalization to be accepted as a reasonable policy option. Therefore, we scrutinized the results of such extremely bad crop cases, or so-called "black swans," individually.
As rice is almost fully supplied by domestic producers in Japan, we focused on the case with the worst productivity shock in Japan (Scenario Rice W) ( For general households, agricultural income (though not just from rice farming) has a very small share in all the 47 prefectures in Japan (Figure 3.3 ). This figure, where 7 For simplicity, we used data only for households with two or more family members reported in NSFIE (48,356 samples) and omitted data for single-member households (3,993 samples). As for farm households, we used data only for self-employed farmers in ABS (1,624 samples) but omitted data for farmers running farming companies (191 samples).
prefectures with a larger share of rice production in the total prefectural agricultural production are ordered from the left, does not indicate conspicuous positive correlation between the large presence of rice farming and high agricultural income. Contrary to this expectation, prefectures with relatively large agricultural income composition often have a small rice farming presence (e.g., Saga, Tottori, Aomori, Kumamoto, Wakayama, Miyazaki, Kagoshima). Therefore, rice trade liberalization can hardly be anticipated to adversely affect the major rice-producing prefectures. Similarly, as little correlation between the agricultural income and income level is observed in Figure 3 .4, rice trade liberalization is not anticipated to have an adverse impact on specific income groups. As discussed above, the decline of rice production would primarily hit smaller-scale farmers, who are likely to be less profitable. Rice farmers with less than 10 hectares of planted acreage produce about 30% of total rice production. Assuming they quit rice-farming, the production of larger-scale farmers is affected little (Figure 3.8) . 9 The rice price fall would also affect large-scale farmers adversely but not so severely because they earn only half of their income from rice-farming (Figure 3.6) . Moreover, larger farmers tend to earn more from non-rice-farming. They can expand their businesses by acquiring farmland released by those small-scale farmers who quit farming and partially cancel out the rice price falls with general price falls of farming materials thanks to the trade liberalization. 
Conclusion
We conducted Monte Carlo experiments with a world trade CGE model to examine the impact of uncertainty of food supply, on which the concern of Japan's national food security is based. Assuming productivity shocks of four major crops all over the world and 9 However, as noted in footnote 7, we omitted data for very large-scale farmers in our analysis. Thus, larger-scale farmers may be forced by trade liberalization to reduce their output. simulating their trade liberalization by Japan, we quantified the contribution of agricultural free trade to securing the supply of these four major crops for Japan. We found that the trade liberalization would bring about not only deterministic gains from trade, which is often predicted by the conventional trade theory, and that these gains would be considerable not only in trade liberalization of rice but also in trade liberalization of wheat and maize, as very high trade barriers are set on these three crops. Additionally, we found that agricultural trade liberalization would bring about stochastic gains from trade by integrating the domestic market with foreign markets and pooling the risks originating from uncertainty of crop yields in these markets. Even if we anticipated extremely bad crops in the major crop-exporting regions to Japan, such as North America, and Australia and New
Zealand, agricultural trade liberalization would not only shift the means of Japan's welfare distributions but, notably, would protect Japan from suffering a negative welfare impact.
We used a Monte Carlo method when we assumed a normal distribution to randomly generate productivity shocks so as not to arbitrarily assume the signs and magnitude of shocks-although the choice of the normal distribution was indeed our own a priori assumption. Alternatively, we can assume other parameter values for the normal distribution and/or other types of distribution to simulate uncertainty of yields. We can demonstrate more disastrous situations that people should more seriously prepare for.
However, we should take note that more disastrous situations occur less frequently, as We assumed no spatial correlations of productivity shocks among the 10 regions in our Monte Carlo experiments. To verify the validity of this simplification, we computed correlations of the regional crop productivity variations (Table A .1). While some coefficients for grain and oilseed between adjacent regions in Asia were found to be large, exceeding, say, 0.5, we found only weak correlations between productivity shocks in adjacent regions. Of course, we can elaborate this productivity estimation part further, following, for example, Furuya and Koyama (2005) by explicitly considering precipitation and temperature in each region, which often correlate with each other globally. However, more elaborated models would generally yield smaller residuals and thus smaller variations of productivity, which are fed into the Monte Carlo experiments as shocks, than those we assumed for our original simulations (Table 2. 2). This would reduce the source of concerns of the national food security and, thus, would be more likely to reinforce our conclusion further. 
